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At a possible transition towards a “flat”, post-human or new-materialist 
environment, many have suggested that archaeological theory and theorizing is 
changing course; turning to metaphysics; leaning towards the sciences; or, even 
is declared dead. Resonating with these concerns, and drawing on our fieldwork 
on a northern driftwood beach, this article suggests the need to rethink 
fundamental notions of what theory is – its morphological being – and how it 
behaves and takes form. Like drift matter on an Arctic shore, theories are adrift. 
They are not natives of any particular territory, but nomads in a mixed world. 
While they are themselves of certain weight and figure, it matters what things 
they bump into, become entangled with, and moved by. Based on this, we argue 
that theories come unfinished and fragile. Much like things stranding on a beach 
they don’t simply “add up” but can become detached, fragmented, turned and 
transfigured. Rather than seeing this drift as rendering them redundant and out 
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Working on the coast of Arctic Norway, returning again and again to the same 
place, the same shore, we have become intrigued by one phenomenon in 
particular; the wealth of stuff accumulating along the intertidal zone of this small 
inlet. Driftwood, worked wood, pallets, buoys, nets, floats, fish boxes, ropes, lines, 
buckets, shovels, footballs, tennis rackets, toy cars, gloves, helmets, shoes, 
sandals, boots, light bulbs, toothbrushes, life-wests, overalls, tuna cans, 
Christmas trees, bottles, whale carcasses, oil barrels, bird bones, ice-cream 
boxes, seaweed, garden chairs. Gathering in a thick wavelike ridge, stretching 
from one end of the cove to the other, the material brakes on land, tumbles and 
tangles in a manner that appears impossible to unravel. Thrown together, things 
bump into each other in weirdly unexpected ways, forming unimaginable 
coalitions and fusions. And in the depths of this amalgam things become pressed 
together, fractured between beach pebbles, to lastly endure as brightly coloured 
freckles in the beach sediments. 
 
Repeatedly encountering this dazing wave of stranded material has been both 
terrifying and intriguing. It concurrently draws and resists our archaeological 
gaze. Familiar and strange its autonomy, post-human drift and gathering 
insinuatingly defies accustomed archaeological notions of locality, cultural 
context and meaning. Its utter and, indeed, very weighty presence scorns 
aspirations of refitting and retracing. Not because it is necessarily impossible, 
but because what appears most authentic about this stuff is not its possible 
naming, origin, past function or human embracement, but the way it has drifted 
out of just those associations, and become fragmented and transmuted in ways 
not foreseen. Then, how should we respond to these things in their tumbled 
articulation? What forms of knowing do they make possible? Or put differently, 
how do you approach a material swell of this sort – and how does its 
unfathomable bulging affect your advancing? 
 
Interestingly, revisiting this odd material over and over again, what at first 
appeared as its profound difference from an archaeological context has 
increasingly revealed itself as affinities and accentuations. Though here 
manifested in more extreme ways, characteristics such as fragmentation, 
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displacement, withdrawal, coincidence, entanglement, are in essence features 
encountered also in more familiar archaeological settings. The difference is more 
one of degree, than of kind. And, thus, what this abounding breaker recalls is also 
an aspect of archaeological being that rarely survives interpretation and 
theoretical encounters. An alterity that theoretical filtration rather repeals and 
compensates for, but which here, in this particular setting of material diaspora, 
appears as a less likely and even futile way to proceed. As such, these beach 
assemblages also bring to light some of the difference and even 
incommensurability between our material and the theoretical bodies we employ 
to interpret it; that is, the difference between the “wild”, scattered and 
incomplete nature of archaeological things and the expected coherency, 
wholeness and rational logic of theory. 
 
But what if one took seriously as a real and significant trait the fragmented and 
“unruly” aspect of our material record and its reluctance to obediently bow to 
the logic and coherency of theory? What could we learn from this resistance and 
from the ways things articulate themselves upon encounter? What kind of 
theorizing would allow inclusion of this experience and grounded knowledge in 
telling and interpretations? And what kind of theory might itself be open to 
modification, and even shattering, as a consequence of such archaeological 
encounters? In other words, is it possible to imagine theory as something else 
than hitherto conceived, something that comes unfinished and fragile? And 
therefore, perhaps, better prepared for embracing and interacting with these 
very particular aspects of the archaeological? 
 
<<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>> 
Fig. 1 A wave of drift matter in Eidsbukta, Finnmark, Norway 
 
Today, in the extended aftermath of post-processual archaeology, at the possible 
transition towards a “flat’”, post-human or new-materialist environment, many 
have suggested that archaeological theory and theorizing is changing course; 
turning to metaphysics; leaning towards the sciences; or, even is declared dead 
(e.g. Bintliff and Peirce, 2011; Alberti et al., 2013; Kristiansen, 2014; Lucas, 2015; 
Thomas, 2015a, 2015b, Harris and Chipolla 2017). Resonating with these 
concerns, and drawing on our fieldwork on the coast of Arctic Norway, this 
article suggests the need to rethink fundamental notions of what theory is, how it 
behaves and takes form, how it may be applied and, even more importantly, 
subtended and furnished. Drawing on current debates it also resonates with a 
deeper lineage of theoretical conversation in archaeology, and recurring themes 
such as the discrepancies between theory and practice, between theory building 
and theory borrowing, between top-down and bottom-up theorizing, and 
between the limits of case based theory and the aspirations for an extended life 
of archaeological theory beyond disciplinary boundaries. It should be 
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emphasized, however, that our ambition is not to provide any detailed 
discussion of what previously has been said about these issues, or to address all 
the different kinds of theory used in archaeology today. Deliberately deviating 
from such standard tropes of theoretical archaeological narration, our aim here 
is to sketch an alternative argument where archaeological things and 
experiences are centre stage. And by attempting a more positive perspective on 
what often is viewed as fallacies of archaeology’s relationship with theory, we 
will seek to explore the possible rewards of its encounter with the archaeological, 
how theory may be fragmented, transformed, repaired and/or reassembled, and 
thereby also provide new potentials for a tradition and art of borrowing.  
 
 
PLACING THE ARGUMENT 
 
Let us begin by trying to situate our course a little more explicitly – and in that 
endeavour refer to a conversation we had recently. Sitting in a noisy pub in 
central Oslo on a late Friday night, together with Levi Bryant, one of the 
prominent spokesmen of object-oriented ontology, and talking about 
archaeological fieldwork of all things, he says; “Well, you know, philosophy is a 
parasitic discipline.” We went silent for a second. How many times haven’t we 
heard the same said about archaeology? About its dependency on theoretical 
supplies from anthropology or philosophy. Then he added, “I mean, we don’t do 
fieldwork”. Again, we were silent for a second, thinking, well, how interesting, 
and how very true – possibly! But what does this actually imply? And what is 
being insinuated when archaeology is accused of the same? 
 
In a recent article Gavin Lucas (2015) makes a convincing go at countering the 
anxieties archaeologists appear to have when it comes to “borrowing” theory. 
Crucial to his argument is the mobility of theory and theorizing, as exemplified by 
the dispersed use of “concept-metaphors” such as identity, gender and agency. 
These are concepts used in cross-disciplinary theorizing, and are characterized 
by their inherent vagueness and weak ontological commitment, which thus at 
the same time both help their mobility as well as make them dependent on being 
articulated through specific contexts and situated empirical observations. 
Drawing rather on a morphological register, we believe it is important also to 
think about what theory is and where it is, in terms of its possible concrete 
“amongstness”. This is not just to say that we need to think about how theory is 
applied and articulated – but, and far more significant, how it is supplemented, 
worked on, and cared for. In other words, our concern is not how theory hovers 
and moves above a disciplinary geography, but how it is morphologically part of 
the actual landscape, how it moves among things and, importantly, becomes 
moved by them. 
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This, we believe, is especially important for archaeologists who consistently 
work with theory in relation to concrete landscapes and things, but also more 
generally for how to understand theory and its relation to “the real”. This 
relation was recently addressed in a blog post by Levi Bryant (2016)2. Here, 
Bryant expresses a distrust in theories that do not employ a rich repertoire of 
“examples”, as this, he worries, may render them “unmoored from anything in 
the world” and release them of the responsibility of really explaining anything of 
this world. Bryant goes further to claim that the example is not merely important 
and formative in retrospect, but also with respect to the future of theory and 
theorizing. He proceeds by addressing fellow object-oriented philosopher 
Graham Harman, asking: 
 
How about Harman?  His favourite examples are fire, cotton, and 
hammers.  How might these archetypal examples inform his entire 
conception of objects?  Would that theory be different if one chose a 
flower or waves or a factory?  When a theorist wishes to write about 
architecture and uses the home as their go to example, how does that 
example come to inform their entire theory of architecture? Examples 
express intuitions about the nature of broader categories like “being”, 
“knowledge”, “truth”, “normativity”, etc.  They are not secondary, but are 
at the core of theoretical work. 
 
This is indeed interesting, though one might ask whether the term “example” is 
the right one to use in this context, or whether it rather misleads and 
downgrades the significance of the relation being underlined? Possibly. In any 
case, this assertion – of the fundamental role of theoretical engagement with the 
real – is at the core of our argument in this paper.  
 
To explain a little further, let us have a look at Harman’s recent book, 
Immaterialism (2016), a kind of manifesto for his object-oriented philosophy, 
where the questions Bryant asks gain even further actuality. Putting hammers, 
cotton and fire to the side, Harman here employs the 17th century Dutch East 
India Company (VOC) as an example of an “object”, in order to outline central 
notions and concepts of his philosophy. Based on an exclusively historical study 
of the VOC and its documented development during its period of operation 
(1602-1795), Harman constructs an object theory, or an OOO methodology, with 
claimed general relevance to the study of any object3. This also involves general 
guidelines related to things’ being, their relations, and the critical phases of 
symbiosis (including death) in their careers (Harman, 2016: 77-85). Proceeding 
                                                        
2 https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2016/07/27/examples/ 
3 Harman sometimes uses the notion ”social objects” (2016: 37, 84-85, 88) but without defining 
what is meant by this term and to what extent it differs from other, non-social objects. 
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from Bryant’s interesting and radical line of argument it feels compelling to ask: 
How would an archaeological approach to the VOC, which obviously also 
included wrecked and sunken ships, released ballast, deserted harbours, 
distributed goods and derelict fortresses, have affected his theory? Would a 
concern with these tactile components of the VOC, with abandoned and derelict 
things, not have led to a somewhat different conception of objects and object 
careers, than one based on written records of a well-functioning and networked 
“social” VOC? And what would have happened to Harman’s conception of objects 
if he chose as his “go to example” ruined herring factories or beach assemblages 
in the north Atlantic? In accordance with Bryant, we would suggest that such 
examples cannot be seen as secondary to theory, but as a constructive and 
integral part of it. One is neither on top of the other nor extracted from the other.  
 
What constitutes the archaeological – like the swell of drift matter on a beach – 
provides abundant evidence of things “that don’t just add up but take on a life of 
their own as problems of thought” (Stewart, 2008: 72). Unlike common 
philosophical examples, where familiar, singular and predefined things are 
selected to illustrate a certain argument and way of reasoning, archaeology is 
committed to things that presence themselves in ways that defy such selectivity 
and control. Randomly surviving in messy assemblages, soiled and broken, they 
mostly address us without the usual crust of cultural meaning. Archaeological 
fieldwork involves exploring a space inhabited by things at the same time 
withdrawn and disclosed, lost and awaiting. How can a theory, or indeed any 
philosophy, embrace these raw things, grasp the potential for knowing already 
inherent in them, and thus expose itself to the threat of being affected, being 
redone by this very encounter?  
 
This, we argue, is what an archaeological theory has to risk. Moreover, in order 
to make such a theory accountable we need to re-establish a trust in things and 
in experiences resulting from our mutual interactions. Learning through 
encounter, from things, increasingly lost weight in the theoretical tropes that 
characterized late 20th century archaeology. This became further reinforced 
through postmodernism’s hermeneutics of suspicion, where the dialectics of 
reading and reflection took both the front and back seat; explaining data as well 
as the explanation itself, which, so to speak, duplicates the futility and misgivings 
of grounding knowledge in things themselves. Accordingly, when establishing 
what counts as knowledge or is accountable for knowing, things and our 
immediate experiences of them became mostly reckoned with distrust and 
suspicion; “… as inheritors of the Cartesian legacy, we would rather put our faith 
in representations instead of matter, believing that we have a kind of direct 
access to the content of our representations that we lack towards that which is 
represented” (Barad, 2007: 380-81).  
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Emphasizing the mobility of theory and “the practice of theorizing over theory”, 
as argued by Lucas (2015: 28-29), represents one way to counter this bias. By 
flattening the relation between theory-work and other (field)work (see 
Edgeworth, 2012), theory is not merely something to be employed, but 
something to be worked on in specific empirical contexts. And, like Lucas’ 
example of how our distinct use of the trowel has rendered it archaeological, 
rather than masonry, it also matters to theory what it matters for. Importantly, 
this is not an argument about selecting a theory that “fits” the specificity of the 
material, but about its morphological ability to be redefined, reworked and 
repaired upon encounter. Not to ignore that theories can be more and less 
suitable in different contexts – there is no “one-size fits all” – but it should also 
make a difference to theory itself whether it harbours with an account of a VOC 
vessel loaded with oriental goods, or among stranded plastic debris in a northern 
inlet. This difference is not just a difference between objects but also constitutes 
an archaeological difference, allowing theorizing to be initiated by the direct 
encounters with a tactile and unsorted world rather than its cleansed 
representations. As put by Karen Barad; 
 
To embrace representationalism and its geometry or geometrical optics 
of externality is not merely to make a justifiable approximation that can 
later be fixed by adding further factors or perturbations at some later 
stage, but rather to start with the wrong optics, the wrong ground state, 
the wrong set of epistemological and ontological assumptions” (Barad, 
2007: 380-81). 
 
Theory as mobile, adrift, bumps into things of different and often unexpected 
kind. And it is not unmoved by these encounters. Theory and theory-work 
doesn’t simply “add up” in a logical, foretold and orderly manner. Rather, much 
like marine debris and things adrift, theory is challenged, torn, transmuted and 
shattered by its encounters with stuff. Not in a negative way, but in a 
constructive, swelling manner. One just needs to think of what disciplinary drift 
did to structuralism and semiotics.  
  
Based on this, an important precondition of our argument is a notion that any 
theory always holds potential for something more than what it was meant to be, 
and more than what it is doing right now4. It always comes unfinished. That is, if 
we consider the practice of theory application as no less an act of 
supplementation/building, theory may in essence be seen to partly exceed 
definition, prescription and finitude. An understanding that, we argue, opens for 
a more constructive discussion of theory and theorizing in archaeology, where 
                                                        
4 With credit to Grahamn Harman (2016) and his notion of an object as 
irreducible to its relations, and hence “more than what it is doing right now”. 
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theory may, much like drift matter, be seen to go through processes of decay, 
fragmentation and dispersion and where, consequently, the inferior legacy of 
“borrowing” may be recast in light of innovation, gentrification and repair. 
 
 
NOTIONS OF THEORY  
 
Before moving further with that discussion, however, let us briefly summarize 
some commonly acknowledged attributes and associations of theory and 
theorizing, as perceived specifically in an archaeological context. Though any 
such attempt at generalization inevitably runs the risk of glossing over 
differences and previous critiques, we still believe it is possible to identify some 
widely shared assumptions and expectations that deserve attention.  
 
As an overall notion, theory in archaeology is perceived as a means by which we 
interpret or explain observed facts, and sometimes simply as “the order we 
choose to put facts in” (Johnson, 2006: 118). In the Concise Oxford Dictionary of 
Archaeology, the entry on archaeological theory describes it as “A body of 
philosophical and theoretical concepts providing both a framework and a means 
for archaeologists to look beyond the facts and material objects for explanations 
of events that took place in prehistory” (Darwill, 2008, emphasis added). 
Statements like this emphasize the indispensable and pivotal nature of theory, 
and reflect the common notion that things cannot speak “without the benefit of 
intervening theory” (Johnson, 2006: 129). Theory’s ambitions, however, range 
wide, including how to explain and understand society and nature, and to 
provide metaphysical justification for how and why we distinguish between 
these realms – or, indeed, how we prefer not to do so. Theory, thus, may be 
viewed as both “foundational” and “revelatory” (Conkey, 2007), as a mental map 
or plan for how to approach and perceive something, and as an eye opener and 
challenge to see things differently. In the latter sense, theory is not simply “a 
stable set of guidelines” to be applied, but “should be thought of in terms of its 
effects” (Conkey, 2007: 297) and how it alters the researcher’s perspective of the 
act and object of study. In other words, whether social, epistemic or ontological, 
theory is not only the means for interpreting the archaeological record, and for 
the knowledge we create from it, but also for critically reflecting on the practice 
of doing so.  
 
A commonly conceived feature of theory, moreover, is that it occupies a sphere 
somehow set off from our doings and the stuff we deal with. Both in everyday 
semantics and scholarly conducts, theory is often seen in contrast to practices, to 
things and the world as immediately manifested and experienced. Despite the 
schism between so-called top-down and bottom-up theorizing, the elevated 
position of theory itself within these opposed approaches is hardly questioned. 
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The same counts for the processualist and post-processualist mantra that all 
data is theory-laden, which despite emphasizing their interconnectedness builds 
upon and reinforces the hierarchy. The image of theory as situated above the 
empirical world, approaching it from distance, also relates directly to its 
assumed explanatory power. A strong theory, as noted by Silvan Tomkins, has a 
generality that allows it to account for “… a wide spectrum of phenomena which 
appear to be very remote, one from the other, and from a common source…” 
(Tomkins, 1963: 433). A theory not fulfilling such generality, pertaining only to 
few or proximate phenomena, is weak and “… little better than a description of 
the phenomena which it purports to explain” (Tomkins, 1963: 433).  
 
Theory, accordingly, is mostly general and abstracted rather than situated and 
concrete. It may emerge from observations on the ground but its strength and 
explanatory success relies as much on its detachment from specific case based 
relations, and its perpetuation, thus, does not necessarily depend on concrete 
empirical verification. Allowing us to go “beyond the facts and material objects”, 
theory becomes a means to depart from mere description, and thus to engage in 
the creative endeavour that is claimed to distinguish an academic archaeology 
from antiquarianism (e.g. Barrett, 2016). Theory, in other words, is revelatory, 
creates relations, unravels meanings, and also makes sense of that which 
otherwise is merely perceived and thus poorly understood or explained.  
 
This leads to yet another common attribute of theory, which is the claim to 
coherence and consistency. Theory provides a model world, which despite also 
encompassing ambitions about explaining or integrating fragmentation and 
contradictions in its explanatory framework (such as in Marxism and 
structuralism), is itself, ideally, devoid of such inconsistencies (see Gero, 2007). 
Also for this very reason, theoretical eclecticism, mixing elements from different 
and even competing theory-frameworks, is met with suspicion and often seen as 
representing inconsistency and insufficient knowledge of the wider bodies of 
thinking which the elements emerge from. Closely related is the expectation of 
theoretical purity; that a theory represents a fixed and ready-made tool-box to 
be applied “as is”, or as faithfully as possible, without much compromises, 
additions, and transformations. The alleged archaeological fallacy of “theory 
borrowing” is at least partially based on this all-or-nothing conception, where 
the use of non-native theory is conceived of as a passive act of moving an already 
processed body of theory from a site of production to a site of application (see 
Lucas, 2015). This, furthermore, ascribes a finitude and confinement to theory 
and the act of theorizing, emphasizing its abstract loci and the absolute divide 
between theory and data. In fact, one might argue that the idea of finitude not 
only grounds a negative notion of “borrowing” but also the repeated claims to 
the death of theory.   
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But what happens if we think theory in different terms? Not only the act of 
theorizing, as in replacing a top-down model with a ground-up one, but also the 
morphological notion of theory and theoretical bodies themselves. Is it possible 
to perceive them in a way that renders them less static and closed? In a way that, 
so to speak, acknowledges their “dark side” – their unrealised excess – and the 
unanticipated potentials mutually discharged through the synergy between data 
and theory? A way that sees theoretical bodies less as solid matters of fact and 
more as fragile matters of concern (cf. Latour, 2004), and as such in need for 
active care, maintenance and repair? 
 
 
THEORY AS A FRAGILE MATTER OF CONCERN 
 
Theory, as outlined above, may be conceived of as what Latour (1987) has called 
an “immutable mobile”. He coined the term to grasp the effect and outcome of 
processes of transformation and inscription, through which something real and 
generally immobile (e.g. landscapes, sediments, archaeological sites, stars) is 
transformed into mobile and standardized (“immutable”) representations easy 
at hand (figures, maps, tables, papers) (Latour, 1987). Contrary to many of the 
“raw” entities of the world, such inscriptions can be accessed without much 
effort and thus also be gathered and mobilized in ways that many real 
substances inhibit. A convenience, Latour argues, which eventually renders these 
phenomena immense sources of power. Being literate on such immutable 
inscriptions gives you the edge on those who are not, as it enables you to 
creatively superimpose, recombine and summarize them in ways that are not 
evidently perceptible or directly reflective of the material phenomena to be 
experienced out there (Latour, 1987: 30). 
  
Theory, theoretical bodies, as normally perceived both in the humanities and the 
social and “hard” sciences, carry many of the features of immutable mobiles. 
Most theorists do not have to engage directly with waste, sea currents, glaciers, 
soils or trowels. On the contrary, inscriptions and discursive matters (numbers, 
statements, arguments, concepts, syntheses) are often their prime entries to the 
world, and theoretical practices very often take the form of commentaries on 
existing philosophical or theoretical statements. For example, in the currently 
blooming theorizing of “objects” and “things” it often appears far more 
significant, natural and appropriate to approach Kant or Heidegger’s 
philosophical inscriptions than to engage concretely with chairs, sewer pipes, 
ruined apartment homes, stranded ships, or land fills. In other words, 
theories/concepts as immutable mobiles often perform as more real, appropriate 
and important than the multifaceted tactile entities out there. 
 
<<INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE>> 
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Fig. 2 The inlet of Eidsbukta seen from Sværholtklubben 
 
However, rather than accepting this as a given feature or rationale of any 
theoretical and scholarly endeavour, we may ask what happens if we start to see 
theory rather as a mutable mobile? That is, as something which doesn't simply 
and always “add up”, but holds some semblance to and even empathy with the 
raw and unprepared entities it strives to near – an oblique and unfinished 
potential that allows for intersection and exchange. What could be gained from 
seeing theory as situated, partial and/or provisional, and even as potentially 
fragile and “weak” (cf. Sedgwick, 1997)? Bearing on Eve Sedgwick’s (1997) 
distinction between “reparative” (weak) and “paranoid” (strong) theory (or 
critical practices), “weak theory”, according to Kathleen Stewart, is one that 
“comes unstuck from its own line of thought to follow the objects it encounters, 
or becomes undone by its attention to things that don’t just add up but take on a 
life of their own as problems of thought” (Stewart, 2008: 72). Unlike a “strong” 
theory, which is paranoid in defending a pre-established conceptual and 
analytical correspondence with objects of the world, a reparative or weak theory 
becomes attuned to and by the rhythms and trajectories of these things. Its 
raison d'être is neither to evaluate them nor “to somehow get their 
representation “right”” (Stewart, 2008: 73), but to provide a space that allows us 
to be moved by them and thus explore “what potential modes of knowing, 
relating and attending to things are already somehow present in them as 
potential or resonance” (Stewart, 2008: 73).  
A weak theory, thus, is one that replaces suspicion and paranoia with trust and 
affinity, and as a result becomes vulnerable and mutable. By following things, a 
weak theory allows us to wonder where they might take us. In that sense, 
theoretical engagement (and interpretation) is not simply yet another comment 
on things already inscribed, but a way of reciprocal or “reparative” reasoning 
that becomes enriched, modified, scarred and complemented through actual 
encounters with things, raw and unkempt. Rather than seeing this as a defeat or 
fallacy that questions the very rationale of having theory at all, this should be 
seen as a productive potential already integral to theory and its way of attending 
to things. In other words, what becomes weakened is not the integrity of theory, 
as such, or the potential for creating knowledge, but rather the fixed notion of 
theory as an always-already finite whole, which morphology is set apart from its 
analytical matters of concern.  
 
In fact, following Bruno Latour (2004), we might say that in this weak notion 
theory becomes transformed from “matter of fact” to “matter of concern”; from 
finite and black-boxed entities to fragile gatherings. Such theory will inevitably 
change and fracture when moved around and brought into contact with different 
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things (cf. Latour, 2004: 237). Less concerned with adjusting these to an 
immutable vocabulary, it becomes moved by them in ways that accommodate 
their particularity; and rather than one-sidedly vocalizing things, theory itself 
becomes articulated through thingly encounters. In other words, the encounter 
with things, with alterity, becomes decisive and constructive also for theory. 
 
 
BEING AND KNOWING 
 
Implicitly, this also involves a rethinking of the relationship between theory and 
data in a more egalitarian way. While there has been much focus on an 
ontological turn also in archaeology and on how archaeological theorizing has 
turned ontological, become more “flat”, and object-oriented (see e.g. Alberti, et al. 
2013; Lucas, 2015; Thomas, 2015b; Edgeworth, 2016, Harris and Chipolla 2017), 
far less attention is devoted to how the altered ontological position of things and 
natures, affects the relationship between theory and data, the production of 
knowledge, and the notion of epistemology more generally. This is intriguing, 
since the new materialist and post-humanist perspectives for sure should create 
other epistemological challenges and possibilities than those emerging from a 
Cartesian bifurcation of the world. And though it may be true that this 
ontological turn has hitherto, in an archaeological context, mostly raised concern 
for “the materiality of our data, not its epistemic status” (Lucas, 2015: 18), it 
appears equitable that the possibility of knowing must be affected as well.  
 
The persistent modern ontological divide for long rendered knowing and 
interpretation an act of reaching that which is beyond things, attending to a 
presumed extra-material domain devoid of objects and non-humans. Much 
epistemological and methodological debate in archaeology, such as the question 
of how to bridge the gap between a static archaeological record and the 
dynamics of past societies, has been rooted in this bifurcation and the 
understanding of societies and cultures as primarily humanly constituted 
entities. The current ontological turn has clearly opened for a different take. 
When no longer treated as epiphenomenal residues of society but as 
indispensable constituents of the world, fundamentally involved also in human 
conducts and social trajectories, the epistemological status of things as data 
cannot remain unchanged. Hence, to argue that the current paradigm shift is 
ontological rather than epistemological, is to overlook the entanglement of 
knowing and being, and may even sustain the very bifurcation that this 
“ontological turn” has attempted to overcome (cf. Barad, 2007: 379-80). 
 
This rhizome character of the current theoretical turbulence relates directly to 
another aspect of this, which has received equally little attention: How does the 
fading of ontological polarities and the growing recognition of non-human 
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agency actually come about? Is it likely that these changes stem solely, or even 
primarily, from pure reasoning, speculations, or “magical” happenings in the 
theorists’ minds? Or is it rather the case that they emerge as a consequence of 
experience and knowledge gained from attending to things, to how they behave, 
and to what is disclosed through acquaintance with their mingled articulations? 
In other words, that ontology depends on knowing as much as knowing depends 
on being. Both are mutually and materially constituted, and, thus, to paraphrase 
Heidegger, “thrown” into the world; into the “There” of “whence and whither” 
(Heidegger, 1962: 174), and from which they cannot be divorced. As forcefully 
argued by Karen Barad: 
 
“Knowledge making is not a mediated activity, despite the common 
refrain to the contrary. Knowing is a direct material engagement, a 
practice of intra-acting with the world as part of the world in its dynamic 
material configuring, its ongoing configuration. The entangled practices of 
knowing and being are material practices.… To the extent that humans 
participate in scientific or other practices of knowing, they do so as part of 
the larger material configuration of the world and its ongoing open-ended 
articulation” (Barad, 2007: 379, our emphasis). 
 
The way things increasingly have articulated themselves as “always-already” 
blending with other things, humans and natures, forming innumerable 
interacting units and collectives, and refusing to orderly “add up”, was clearly 
vital for the emerging disintegration of the Cartesian legacy. Ever more 
pressingly confronted with messy assemblages weakened the cohesion of this 
prevailing ontology, and what previously appeared as finite matters of fact 
gradually stood out as important matters of concern (Latour, 1993, 2004).  
 
Concern, awareness and knowledge created in response to these material 
articulations should therefor also be seen as decisive for rethinking other aspects 
pertaining to things’ being. Consider for example Graham Harman’s proposition 
regarding things’ autonomy from their yet inextricable entanglement in webs of 
relations and interactions, and the related notion that they are always more than 
what they are doing and thus not exhausted by use and human intentions 
(Harman, 2002, 2016). While sympathizing with his position, a crucial question 
is still how one can arrive at such understandings, become convinced about their 
truthfulness, without seeing knowing and being as entangled in material 
practices and as interactively constitutive of each other? How can one know so 
much about things’ being and at the same time claim it to be non-knowable? 
(Harman, 2016: 17). This is not to say that knowledge of their being by any 
means can be exhaustive; in fact, it will probably always be partial, preliminary 
and to some extent uncertain. But to acknowledge things’ autonomy, resistance, 
and reservoir of potential still requires attentiveness to their “open-ended 
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articulations” and to how they thereby become “problems of thought”. Thus, far 
from being beyond or “above” (“meta”) the “material” (“physics”), ontology itself 
emerges from a “thrown” condition and is morphed in responsiveness to matter 
(cf. Gumbrecht, 2004: 22). 
 
This we find crucial for how to conceive of theory, its formation and immediate 
connection to the world; in other words, how it comes into being. And it is the 
palimpsest relationship between theory as a mutable mobile and a fragmented, 
differentiated world, that needs to be retained; both as pertaining to the internal 
fragility of the theoretical body, and with respect to its enmeshment with an 
equally fragile and unfinished world. Because, as so eloquently stated by 
Kathleen Stewart, “matter in an unfinished world is itself indefinite – a not yet 
that fringes every determinate context or normativity with a margin of 
something deferred or something that failed to arrive, or has been lost, or is 
waiting in the wings, nascent, perhaps pressing” (Stewart, 2008: 80). Attaining to 
this unfinished world may seem futile and unpromising, especially as compared 
to the neat and coherent representations that most theories and philosophical 
reasoning put their faith in. Yet, it is this unfiltered world, that is constitutive of 
our being and accountable for our knowing.  
 
<<INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE>> 
Fig. 3 Entangled drift matter in Eidsbukta 
 
 
LESSONS FROM DRIFT 
“[H]ammers aren’t exclusively for hammering. Apparent functioning is subtended by 
malfunctioning” (Morton, 2012: 98) 
 
Let us return again to our Arctic inlet and the swell of stuff on its shore. We 
asked at the beginning of the article what forms of knowing these things might 
make possible, and how their being and bulging might affect our advancing – and 
our theorizing? As we explained, but is possibly articulated more strongly 
through the verse of photography (see figures 1-5), the weighty and unruly 
presence of these things on a today humanly abandoned shore, in many ways 
defies accustomed archaeological reasoning. Notions of cultural context and 
meaning become baffled, and though many things may indeed be recognized by 
name and function, and even retraced to sources and human relations, what 
appears most authentic and genuine about this stuff is its post-human drift. What 
it has become beyond the measures of the human. In other words, what the 
possible familiarity and recognition of things recalls on encounter is not so much 
a known and familiar past as an utterly unexpected and unfamiliar future; how 
things have drifted out of past associations, and become fragmented, detached 
and transmuted in ways not foreseen. 
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So, how do we attend to such things that do not just add up, and in ways that also 
don’t just add up, but allow us to be moved by their being and to explore modes 
of knowing that “are already somehow present in them as potential or 
resonance” (Stewart, 2008: 73). How should we take the material seriously as it 
presents itself here and now? One aspect of this responsiveness is to 
acknowledge the realness of these articulations, and how these stranded things 
have taken on “a life of their own as problems of thought” (Stewart, 2008: 73); a 
“life” that defies but also suggests ways of theoretical proceedings. For example, 
encountering hybrid assemblages of sea-borne things, it is indeed hard not to 
think of their resistance and autonomy in relation to our intentions, prospects 
and programs. Many of them have travelled long distances, spent years at sea, 
and been to places unheard of – they have abandoned their human companions 
and their intentions for them, established new alliances, and many of them will 
surely outlive us. Considering, the autonomy and unpredicted futures of these 
drifting things, in what way can we sustain a notion of the present as the 
outcome of a solely human past? To what extent can we claim that things are 
innocent beings, reducible to simple means towards our ends? And given the 
blatant exposure of their unruliness, how do they affect the way we think about 
objects more generally, including their agency, life and affordances?  
 
<<INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE>> 




Indeed, things have been thoroughly theorized in philosophy and elsewhere. 
Their agency and ability to act has been dealt with by Alfred Gell (1998) and 
Bruno Latour (1987, 2005), their social life has been theorized by Igor Kopytoff 
(1986) and Arjun Appadurai (1986), their affordances by James Gibson (1986), 
their entrenched power by Jane Bennett (2010), their affect by Brian Massumi 
(2002), and their ontology by Martin Heidegger (1962), Graham Harman (2002, 
2016) and Levi Bryant (2011), to name a few. But how does the artwork in Gell’s 
theorizing articulate installations on an Arctic shore? How do concepts like de-
commodification, social life, vitality or waste work with these vagabonds? And 
what happens to already articulated notions of affect, affordance and, indeed, 
agency, when juxtaposed with these drifting things? As we have argued, it 
matters to theory what it matters for; agency, as an example, is not – should not – 
be the same when weighed against artworks, citizens’ with guns, VOC vessels, or 
drift matter. Harbouring in new territories, encountering new things, affects 
theory. It quivers and loosens and reveals its fragility, but equally so its ability to 
spill over, swell and grow into novel and unforeseen directions. Hence, a theory 
of agency becomes pruned and enriched through an encounter with drift matter. 
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While human involvement and inter-action may have been significant to its 
articulation on different soils, these attributes lose their gravity or pendulum on 
an uninhabited Arctic shore. This is not to scorn the significance and originality 
of the works of Gell, Latour and others, but to emphasise three related points; 
firstly, that the “example”, the matter of concern, is central to theory and to what 
theory becomes; secondly, that theory, for that very reason, is fragile, attentive 
and “weak” for what it matters for; and, thirdly, that theory, thus, is always more 
than what it is doing right now. The wealth of its affordance cannot be foreseen 
at the outset or in any one case study. 
 
Moreover, and importantly, this fragility and weakness is also what keeps theory 
alive. It is not a weakness in the negative sense of a disadvantage or flaw, but 
rather in the sense of an affinity, an empathy and even enduring affection for the 
unfamiliar and other. Hence, this also adorns theory and theorizing with a crucial 
ethical aspect; theorizing is not a matter of conquest but a cautious process of 
exploring tensions, potentials and future trajectories for both things and 
concepts, by putting both at risk. Think again of the amalgam of stuff stranded in 
our Arctic inlet – though much of it may be recognizable and familiar, it all 
appears novel and other on this new terrain. Things are at the same time 
detached, transmuted, torn, woven, skirted in ways that could not be foretold, 
many of them fragmented and deformed. However, and as recalled in the 
assembly’s partial familiarity, this recasting is not realized so much by way of 
substitution as by persistency, drift and disclosure. Things remain, but reveal 
themselves differently. When divorced from previous human relations and 
usefulness, things not only become exposed to other trajectories and futures, but 
also expose some of their own otherness. When met on the beach they reveal 
sides of their being that remained hidden or withdrawn while acting within the 
network of a “homely repertoire”. Here, in their stranded redundancy, they show 
themselves differently – and we are able to see them differently. 
 
We may think of theory in very much the same manner. While comfortably 
moving within the confines of a human society, reverberating exclusively human 
relations and intentions, agency theory may be extremely fruitful, but is able 
only to swell so far. However, when brought out of this milieu and into, for 
example, a more or less human devoid archaeological context, not to mention a 
post-human context like the one being shaped in our Arctic inlet, agency theory 
shows itself differently – and we are able to see it differently. What functioned 
well in a previous context, like the significance of delegation and distributed 
personhood (Gell, 1998; Latour, 2005), here faces friction and juxtaposition in 
new encounters. And while this may be seen as fallacy, a theory out of place and 
unfit for the challenges encountered, it may also more productively be seen as 
opening up alternative agental vistas and other accentuations. It is this ability, 
this weakness, we claim, that makes theory work; its resilience and indeed 
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development depend on its dialectics of functioning and mal-functioning (cf. 
Morton, 2012).  
 
Like things, theory doesn’t simply add up and make sense. Rather, much like 
other things washed up on a beach, theories, such as agency, becomes polished, 
nuanced, turned and transfigured. And in order to function it must be allowed 
also to malfunction and thereby disclose otherwise hidden aspects of its being. 
Following this we may even argue for theory, what Harman argues for objects; 
that it “is better known by its proximate failures than by its success” (Harman, 
2016: 116). And, while often insinuated as a rational act of constructing 
coherency and logic, theorizing is as much an act of being attuned to and staying 
with trouble (cf. Haraway, 2016), to see where it may lead. Or, as argued by 
Timothy Morton (2012); “Mastery could superficially mean knowing how the 
tool functions so well that I don’t have to think about it … Yet mastery could also 
be about realizing that functioning is a special kind of malfunctioning to which 
I’m not attending enough. So mastery could be allowing things to malfunction” 
(Morton, 2012: 103). Hence, mastering theory, borrowing theory, in other words 
theorizing, can be seen as an act of exposing theory to new vistas, and allowing it 
to malfunction in order to sustain its legacy.   
 
If theory was a finite black-boxed entity, hovering above and enlightening a 
presumably uncharged world down there, it becomes difficult to explain its 
survival and legacy beyond the momentary. But by acknowledging how theory 
and things interact, and the many similarities between the two, it becomes 
possible to explore the full complexity of theoretical morphology, a richer and 
more tangible pedigree of theoretical development, and how a “parasitic” 
discipline like archaeology importantly contributes to that swelling. 
 
 
TO CONCLUDE: IN DEFENCE OF AN ART OF BORROWING 
 
Our approach in this article has been morphological; that is, our focus has been 
on how theories are conceived of and structured and how this affect the way 
they work and behave.  We suggested at the outset that the very notion of theory, 
as prevailing in archaeology, needed a rethinking and we have explained what 
this implies and why it is of significance. It is pertinent to accentuate, moreover, 
the very archaeological grounding of that rethinking. Our argument does not 
merely benefit from a reference to things, but has literally been borne and 
developed out of engagements with drift matter in a northern inlet and through 
many other studies of archaeological assemblages, new and old. As we have 
stated, though strongly accentuated by the tumbled and torn masses of marine 
debris, the thingly characteristics radiated here are in fact shared with much of 
the archaeological more generally. Fragmentation, decay, inconsistency, 
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detachment and entanglement are not so much the “problems” archaeology deals 
with on daily basis, as the nuances that actually constitute our craft. And what 
we wished to bring forth through this article is that this not only holds true for 
our literal fieldwork and dealings with things, but also for how we “borrow” and 
work with theory. 
 
<<INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE>> 
Fig. 5 “Trownness”: Drift matter in Eidsbukta 
 
We sympathize with scholars arguing for the indispensable nature of theory and 
theorization as part of archaeological work. However, we have sought to 
undermine the common notion (and the implied hierarchy) that things cannot 
speak “without the benefit of intervening theory” (Johnson, 2006: 129), as also 
expressed in the almost ontologized notion that all data is theory-laden. By 
emphasizing the morphological aspects of theorization, we have argued that 
theory cannot articulate itself without an intimate engagement and empathy 
with the world. This may very well be revelatory for how things work, but things 
are no less revealing for theory and theoretical function/malfunction. Therefore, 
and importantly, this is not merely a matter of “reference” or “examples”, but 
rather of how theory is part of the world, is “thrown” into it, and, thus, much like 
the objects it seeks to frame, fragmentary, polluted and eclectic.    
 
Like drift matter on an Arctic shore, theories are adrift. They are not natives 
confined to any particular territory, but nomads in a mixed world, always 
accommodating themselves to shifting local conditions. While they are 
themselves of certain weight and figure, and inimitable and irreducible in that 
sense, it matters what they matter for; it matters what things they bump into, 
what networks and meshworks they become entangled in. We may think of this 
in line with Manuel DeLanda’s explanation for the partial autonomy of individual 
parts in assembled action. It is important, DeLanda (2006: 10-11) argues, not to 
conflate a thing’s (here: theory’s) characteristic properties with its capacities to 
interact with other entities. While the former may be known or rateable, though 
even this may be relative, the latter cannot be grasped or foretold at any given 
moment. That is, though dependent on its properties, a theory’s capacity to act 
cannot be reduced to those, since its realization refers to interaction with 
properties and capacities of other entities. Therefore, as capacities of becoming 
may partly be seen as afforded by a theoretical body or concept – already resting 
in its “physique” – its actual becoming is realized only through association with 
things, with the world, which adds an aspect of volatility to its potential future. 
Any theory is more than what it is doing right now. It has a “dark side”, an un-
foretold excess, that only becomes discharged through drift and through the 
synergy emerging from new encounters. Hence, like other nomads of uncertain 
terrain, it isn’t so much the point of origin that matters as the drift and 
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encounters with ever new territories, ever new things, that becomes telling for a 
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